In Bayesian regression, we often use a Gaussian observation model, where we control the level of aleatoric uncertainty with a noise variance parameter. By contrast, for Bayesian classification we use a categorical distribution with no mechanism to represent our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty. Our work shows that explicitly accounting for aleatoric uncertainty significantly improves the performance of Bayesian neural networks. We note that many standard benchmarks, such as CIFAR-10, have essentially no aleatoric uncertainty. Moreover, we show that data augmentation in approximate inference softens the likelihood, leading to underconfidence and misrepresenting our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty. Accordingly, we find that a cold posterior, tempered by a power greater than one, often more honestly reflects our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty than no tempering --- providing an explicit link between data augmentation and cold posteriors. We further show that we can match or exceed the performance of posterior tempering by using a Dirichlet observation model, where we explicitly control the level of aleatoric uncertainty, without any need for tempering.

In Bayesian regression, we often use a Gaussian observation model, where we control the level of aleatoric uncertainty with a noise variance parameter. By contrast, for Bayesian classification we use a categorical distribution with no mechanism to represent our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty. Our work shows that explicitly accounting for aleatoric uncertainty significantly improves the performance of Bayesian neural networks. We note that many standard benchmarks, such as CIFAR-10, have essentially no aleatoric uncertainty. Moreover, we show that data augmentation in approximate inference softens the likelihood, leading to underconfidence and misrepresenting our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty.

In Bayesian regression, we often use a Gaussian observation model, where we control the level of aleatoric uncertainty with a noise variance parameter. By contrast, for Bayesian classification we use a categorical distribution with no mechanism to represent our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty. Our work shows that explicitly accounting for aleatoric uncertainty significantly improves the performance of Bayesian neural networks. We note that many standard benchmarks, such as CIFAR-10, have essentially no aleatoric uncertainty. Moreover, we show that data augmentation in approximate inference softens the likelihood, leading to underconfidence and misrepresenting our beliefs about aleatoric uncertainty.

Benchmark datasets used for image classification tend to have very low levels of label noise. When Bayesian neural networks are trained on these datasets, they often underfit, misrepresenting the aleatoric uncertainty of the data. A common solution is to cool the posterior, which improves fit to the training data but is challenging to interpret from a Bayesian perspective. We explore whether posterior tempering can be replaced by a confidence-inducing prior distribution. First, we introduce a "DirClip" prior that is practical to sample and nearly matches the performance of a cold posterior. Second, we introduce a "confidence prior" that directly approximates a cold likelihood in the limit of decreasing temperature but cannot be easily sampled. Lastly, we provide several general insights into confidence-inducing priors, such as when they might diverge and how fine-tuning can mitigate numerical instability.

To get Bayesian neural networks to perform comparably to standard neural networks it is usually necessary to artificially reduce uncertainty using a "tempered" or "cold" posterior. This is extremely concerning: if the prior is accurate, Bayes inference/decision theory is optimal, and any artificial changes to the posterior should harm performance. While this suggests that the prior may be at fault, here we argue that in fact, BNNs for image classification use the wrong likelihood. In particular, standard image benchmark datasets such as CIFAR-10 are carefully curated. We develop a generative model describing curation which gives a principled Bayesian account of cold posteriors, because the likelihood under this new generative model closely matches the tempered likelihoods used in past work.

Recent work has observed that one can outperform exact inference in Bayesian neural networks by tuning the "temperature" of the posterior on a validation set (the "cold posterior" effect). To help interpret this phenomenon, we argue that commonly used priors in Bayesian neural networks can significantly overestimate the aleatoric uncertainty in the labels on many classification datasets. This problem is particularly pronounced in academic benchmarks like MNIST or CIFAR, for which the quality of the labels is high. For the special case of Gaussian process regression, any positive temperature corresponds to a valid posterior under a modified prior, and tuning this temperature is directly analogous to empirical Bayes. On classification tasks, there is no direct equivalence between modifying the prior and tuning the temperature, however reducing the temperature can lead to models which better reflect our belief that one gains little information by relabeling existing examples in the training set. Therefore although cold posteriors do not always correspond to an exact inference procedure, we believe they may often better reflect our true prior beliefs.